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Abstract 
l’t is generally recognized that the ability to contemplate and communicate 
about the knowledge, beliefs, and goals of oneself and others is a benchmark 
of human cognition. Yet, little is known about the beginnings of this ability, 
in large measure because methods for accurately assessing very young chil- 
dren’s ubility have been unavailable. Here we present the results of using a 
method of convergent analyses of naturally occurring speech to assess the 
young child’s ability to contemplate and communicate about mental state. The 
first study describes the frequency and function of verbs of mental reference 
such as think and know in the speech of one child from 2;4 to 4;O. The second 
examines shorter samples of speech collected from 30 two-year-olds ol*er a 6 
m.onth period. Results from both studies suggest that the earliest uses of mental 
verbs are for conversational functions rather than for mental refe,rence. First 
attempts at mental reference begin to appear in some children’s speech in the 
second half of the third year. Since most of the children studied exhibited the 
linguistic knowledge necessary to make reference to mental states, we conclude 
that the absence of such reference earlier suggests that still younger children 
lack awareness of such states, or at the very least, an understandl’ng of their 
appropriateness as topics of conversation . 
One facet of a mature concept of persons is the understanding !rhat people 
possess beliefs, thoughts, and intentions that are part (of their internal world. 
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distinct from the world of observable behavior and physical events. Although 
researchers have investigated understandings of the mental world in children 
as young as four (see Wellman, in press), the beginnings of such understand- 
ings are essentially unknown. Basic issues still remaining include the question 
of when children begin to differentiate mental states and processes from 
external behaviors and events, the nature of these early differentiations, and 
the sorts of precursors they may have. 
Investigating these issues for very young children presents a particularly 
difficult problem. Virtually all studies examining children’s knowledge of the 
mental domain use language as the medium of assessment. For young chil- 
dren, one must ask whether language is an appropriate medium for accurate 
assessment or whether evidence of early understanding of the internal world 
may be misconstrued because of the child’s linguistic immaturity. In this 
paper we present two studies using a method that, while still language-based, 
we believe addresses the concern for accurate early assessment. 
The classic method for collecting data on knowledge of the mental world 
is the interview (Broughton, 1’978; Piaget, 1929). More recently, methods 
better suited to young children have been used. One is the identification of 
mental terms in naturally occurring speech. From 2*/2 years on, children use 
mental terms such as think, know, and remember in their spontaneous speech 
(Limber, 1973). The occurrence of such lexical items might be taken as evi- 
dence that young children have a theory of mind (Bretherton et caf. T 1981). 
There are reasons however, to question such an interpretation. Adults use 
such terms for a variety of conversational functions, some of which do not 
make direct reference to a mental state. For example, there are conventional 
pause-fillers such as you know and phrases used to mitigate a demand, as in 
I think I want a cookie. These convers&ional uses, as we call them, are 
. derived from the semantic properties of the verbs referring to the mental 
domain, yet clearly they are not intended to make specific reference to the 
listener’s or speaker’s knowledge state. Whereas adults most probably under- 
stand the indirect relation between mental reference and these conversational 
functions, it is questionable whether children do., Moreover, children may 
recruit mental terms for certain conversational functions without even an 
understauding or awareness of mental states themselves. The mere occur- 
rence of a word in a child’s speech does not necessarily indicate that its 
producer understands its semantic presuppositions. Children’s early uses of 
W&S often indicate different or incomplete semantic unden innings com- 
pared to those of adults (Clark, 1978; Nelson, et al., 1978). H .,nce, an inves- 
~@U~OII of the child’s knowledge of mental life needs to go !*tiyond the iden- 
tification of mental terms in spontaneous speech. 
One study has gone a step further by investigating how mental terms are 
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used in children’s speech. Gelman and Shatz (1977) found both mental refer- 
ence and conversational uses in the speech of children as young as 4 years. 
Their method, relating form to function, has yet to be app!ied to still younger 
children. Even the Gelman and Shatz analysis (or the similar one of Gearhart 
and Hall, 1978 (Reference Note 1)) does not solve all of the problems that 
arise in attempting to assess younger children’s knowledge. For one, their 
coding scheme relies on language use to display cognitive competence. Young 
children may be unabSe to express mental reference the way 4-year-olds do 
because of linguistic deficiencies. If this is so, the young child’s ability may 
be underestimated. 
Second, there are some instances of mental expressions for which it is very 
hard to assign a functional code with certainty. For example, a child sees a 
person recover his coat from a closet and says “He remembered his coat.” 
In such cases, it may be impossible to tell whether the child is referring to a 
mental state (the retriever’s remembering) or tu the correlated act of success- 
fully finding the coat. With no way to distinguish between the two pos- 
sibilities, the best a coder can do is to be consistent about the category to 
which such utterances are assigned. Gelman and Shatz coded such utterances 
as instances of mental reference. To the extent that such instances are com- 
mentaries on behavior (finding) and not genuine expressions of mental state 
(remembering), the frequency of mental state expressions would be overesti- 
mated. With 4-year-olds, potential overestimation is not a serious problem 
because a second method supports the interpretations from natural language 
use. An experimental study which carefully varied the factors of behavioral 
outcome and knowledge state has shown that 4-year-olds can go beyond 
reference to overt performance in their use of remember, know, and guess 
(Johnson and Wellman, 1980). As an example, in a trick condition, children 
who had previously seen an item hidden insisted that they knew where it had 
been concealed even though their attempts to find the object were admittedly 
unsuccessful. 
However, younger children’s responses in such experimental tasks are un- 
informative: young children often simply answer indiscriminately, using the 
focal term in all possibilities and/or saying ‘“yes” to everything (Misciones. et 
al., 1978; Wellman and Johnson, 1979). Hence, while the two different 
methods (form-function analysis of natural speech and experimental tasks) 
provide converging evidence on the abilities of children aged four and older, 
the problem remains of how to assess accurately the knowledge of still 
younger children. 
In addressing this problem, we have modified and extended the Gelman 
and Shatz method of analyzing naturally occurring speech. To minimize the 
overestimation of the child’s knowledge, we have limited to a greater extent 
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the kinds of utterances classed as mental state expressions by creating addi- 
tional separate functional categories for utterances such as references to ac- 
tion (as in the earlier remember example). (See Function Codes below.) 
Further, we also examined those utterances that were classed as mental state 
expressions to identify those in which the child-speaker spontaneously con- 
trasted reality and nonreality, action and intention, and fact and belief. (See 
Contrastives below.) While such explicit contrasts are not the only instances 
of mental terms whiclr can be taken as indications of understandings of mental 
state. we take them to be especially informative cases because the recognition 
that mental events can be at variance with observable events seems to be a 
core element in understanding the internal world. Indeed, making the differ- 
ence explicit seems to be a prime motivation for express’ing mental states 
among adults. These sorts of contrastive utterances, then, constitute a 
paradigm case of mental state expression, and they would be good evidence 
that the young child’s conception of the internal world is similar at least in 
one way to the adult%. To the extent that they occur in a coded corpus of 
mental state expressions, we have assurance that we are not overestimating 
the young child’s abiity. In sum, we are conservative about what we code as 
mental state expressions, and we further consider how many of the instances 
so identified are Taradigmatic contrastive cases. 
The underestimation problem concerns the issue of whether the expression 
of mental reference is masked or delayed by linguistic deficits. That is, one 
can ask whether there is evidence that children might have a concept of 
mental life but have difficulty with the linguistic forms used to express it, or 
whether there is evidence that the requisite linguistic skill is available for 
expressing mental reference before it actually appears. To address this ques- 
tion, we have examined the kinds of syntactic constructions used to express 
mental state and then looked for evidence of their productivity elsewhere. 
To the extent that the syntactic forms most associated with the expression of 
mental state do not appear to be readily available to the child, then there 
would be evidence that reliance on linguistic measures may underestimate 
the child’s understanding of the mental world. On the other hand, if there 
are no deficiencies with the requisite structures, then the use of linguistic 
measures would be more justifiable. 
TO sammaize, we use a multi-pronged method to investigate the early use 
of mental terms in the natural language of very young children. We identify the 
ou=rrence of mental terms, we utilize a revised form of the Gelman and 
!%a& cuding system to distinguish clearly conversational from potentially 
mental uses of such terms, and we identify instances of contrastives within 
the category of mental state expressions. Finally, we assess the syntactic 
ampetence of our subjects with regard to their linguistic preparedness for 
prcDducing expressions of mental state. 
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We report two studies. First and primarily, there are analyses of longitu- 
dinal data on one child, from age 2 to 4 years. Next, confirmation of the basic 
patterns in the crucial first stage of the production of mental terms is sought 
by analyzing samples of speech, from 30 additional 2-year-olds. 
Study 1 
Method 
Data collection and transcription 
Samples of one child’s spontaneous speech from age 2 years; 4 months to 4;0 
were examined. The subject was a white, middle class male child (Abe) of 
graduate student parents. These samples have been analyzed elsewhere for 
other purposes (e.g., Kuczaj and Maratsos, 1975). There were 157 samples 
during the 20 month period reported here. Each sample represented 20 to 30 
minutes of conversation gathered approximately twice a week at meal or 
playtimes when the child was interacting with one or both parents. On rare 
occasions other adults or children were present. Samples were transcribed 
using standard English orthography. Sentence fragments which were not false 
starts were counted as separate utterances, as were one word utterances. 
Table 1 presents a!! mental terms which were identified in the transcripts. 
Only words such as remember, think, know and dream, which might in adult 
usage refer to higher level cognitive processes, were included in this study. 
No attempt was made to characterize the use of other sorts of words to refer 
to mental states. Analyses were then performed only on verbs since noun and 
adjective forms occurred very rarely; 95% of a!! mental terms identified were 
verbs. 
The transcripts were grouped in two ways for analysis. The first was into 
20 monthly segments. Considering the data at this level provides the detail 
necessary for determining the order of first occurrences of terms and func- 
tions. However, given the infrequency of mental verb use relative to the 
sample sizes, we grouped the da,ta into four 5-month blocks for most other 
analyses. 
Function codes 
Utterances containing one or more mental verbs were categorized according 
to a modified version of a code developed by Gelman and Shatz (1977). This 
code characterized the function of mental terms in the conversation, consid- 
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a 38% of all uses of km, $,J ~~~u~eci in the phrase I Don? Know. The figure in parentheses gives 
the occurrences of the verb 1 YW cwcluding instances of I Don’t Know. 
b Use of suppose in passive fol I 7 synonym of the modal form should was excluded from con- 
sideration. 
ering the context of the ongoing interaction. The coder interpreted the child’s 
meaning of the utterance by considering what generally seemed to be happen- 
ing in the interaction and the meaning of the sentences preceding and follow- 
ing the sentence with a mental verb. In assigning codes, the coder often 
paraphrased the mental expression to help determine the function of the 
word in the utterance. Then the paraphrase would be examined in relation 
to context to determine whether it was appropriate. For example, “I think” 
in “It’s a bdl, I think”, would be paraphrased as “maybe.” (See Gelman and 
Shatz, 1977, for further discussion of the general coding procedures.) 
7%~ acquisitiot~ of menial verbs 307 
If the child’s meaning was unclear, the utterance was judged to be indeter- 
minate, as were those instances for which more than one interpretation could 
be assigned equally appropriately. Approximately 10% of the utterances with 
mental verbs were coded as indeterminate and excluded from further 
analysis. Other utterances excluded from further consideration included sen- 
tence fragments and exact repetitions of a child’s own utterance. For exam- 
ple, “I know that” said four times without interruption, was coded only once. 
Direct responses to parental requests such as “I thirlk it’s in the drawer” in 
response to the question “Where do you think it is?“, were also excluded 
since mental verbs may have been used only to maintain discourse coherence 
from speaker to speaker without serving any further mental function. In all, 
functions were coded for 89% of Abe’s utterances which contained a mental 
verb. 
Codable utterances were sorted into seven categories. The first four 
categories, with the exceptions noted below, use definitions from Gelman 
and Shatz. The remaining three categories represent refinements on the initial 
set. 
(1) MentaZ State. An utterance is classified as Mental State only if the 
mental term is judged, with regard to its context, to refer to the thoughts, 
memories or knowledge of the speaker, listener, or a third person. Examples 
are: ‘She doesn’t know all this’ (referring to an absent child) and “I didn’t, 
‘cept I tricked you.” Because one never has direct access to another’s 
thoughts, the determination of what is genuinely a reference to a mental state 
is of course open to some question. For example, one could argue that the 
child who said, “I didn’t, ‘cept I tricked you” was not referring to a belief 
state but was merely correcting himself. Mowever, the context of the child’s 
remark suggests that the child was more likely using the verb trick in reference 
to his father’s understanding of the preceding interchange, which had gone 
as follows: 
F: Did you have any dreams last night? 
C: No, I didn’t have any dreams at all. 
F: Oh. 
C: I didn’t, ‘cept I tricked you. I did have dreams. 
Similarly, context helps classify “She doesn’t know all this.” It is more likely 
that utterance was a reference to another child’s mental state rather than to 
task failure because the child in question was absent from the room. If the 
child in question had been in the room and failing at a relevant task, then 
one could argue that the utterance merely expressed the fact of f&hue. In 
the absence of a simultaneous perception of failure, that alternative becomes 
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less viable. Classification of an utterance as an expression of mental state, 
then, depends on that classification being the most plausible interpretation 
given what is known about both the linguistic and the nonlinguistic context. 
(2) Modulation of assertion. These utterances mark the degree of certainty 
with which a speaker makes an assertion. They can either strengthen the 
assertion, as in “I know this fits too” (after being challenged) or weaken it, 
as in “I think this is a lamb” (in response to “What’s this?“). 
(3) Directing the interaction. Utterances in this category focus the conver- 
sation or are used in a general way to aid interaction: Examples include 
attempts to (a) gain attention, e.g., “It’s a hat, you know”, (b) introduce or 
get information, “Know what?“, “Remember where the dirt is?” and (c) 
introduce an activity “I thoughted we’d eat some cake” or “I guess I’ll go for 
a ride.” 
(4) Clarificution. Utterances in this category clarify the child’s or another’s 
utterance, or ask for clarification. An example of a clarification would be: *‘I 
mean the other one.” Clarifications also took the form of repairs, for exam- 
ple, “It’s a hat, I mean, CI scarf.” 
(5) Expression of desire. Utterances expressing a desire via the use of a 
mental term such as hope or wish were coded separately because they often 
seemed to be paraphrasable by want statements. Expressions such as “I hope 
we have popcorn” would have been coded as Mental State in the Gelman 
and Shatz code but not in the present scheme. 
(6) Action-memory. When verbs of memory or knowing were used clearly 
to refer to actions or the omission of an action, they were coded as action- 
memory. An example would be “Don’t forget mine home,” said by Abe to 
urge his parents to bring along a toy house on a trip. Such uses seemed to 
be neither references to mental state nor attempts to direct an interaction. 
Rather, they often seemed to be prompts or reminders about action on the 
part of the hearer. 
The coding of expression of desire and action-memory utterances sepa- 
rately from the Gelman and Shatz categories serves to make the present code 
both more specific and more conservative with regard to what gets counted 
as an expression of mental state. 
(7) I don’t know. The phrase I don’t know, without a predicate comple- 
ment, occurred often in Abe’s speech. In many instances, especially early 
ones, this appeared to be merely an idiomatic negative expression. A variety 
of interpretations of this phrase were virtually always possible. Thus, all 
instances of I don’t know were separated into this one category. (Gelman and 
Shatn examined only utterances longer than four words in length and so did 
not deal with such utterances.) 
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Additional codes 
Con trastives 
Contrastives are those sentences which mark an understanding of a differ- 
ence or discrepancy between some mental state and present or observable 
reality. In the utterance, “Before I thought this was a crocodile; now I know 
it’s an alligator”, a prior belief is explicitly contrasted with the current state 
of affairs. “I’m just pretending” in response to the question “Are they really 
dead?” is an explicit reference to reality or lack of it. References only to lack 
of knowledge, e.g., “I didn’t know you went to the store” were not coded as 
contrastives nor were utterances made during fantasy play or lies (e.g., “I 
think we went to the moon yesterday”). Because the identification of contras- 
tives is an important component of our method, we present here several 
further examples: “I was teasing you; I was pretending ‘cept you didn’t know 
that.” “ The people thought Dracula was mean, but he was nice.” “I thought 
there wasn’t any socks, but when I looked I saw them.” 
Initiation 
We have already noted that mental verbs which appeared to be exact 
repetitive conversational responses were not considered for additional analysis. 
To determine further how spontaneous the use of mental verbs was, we noted 
whether the child’s use of a mental verb was (a) the initial use of that mentnl 
worfi in a sequence of conversation, (b) a repetition of the child’s own use 
of the word in that same turn or in a previous turn, or (c) a repetition of the 
parent’s use of the word in the previous two turns. 
Form coding 
Utterances containing mental verbs were also categorized in two wayc 
according to syntactic criteria. First, a distinction was made between simple 
and complex utterances, with the former having one verb phrase (“I knob+ 
it”) and the latter having more than one (“I think he knows it”). The second 
characterization was derived from the work of Shatz and Gelman (1973). 
They showed that mental verb use often occurs in complex sentences with 
predicate complements (e.g., “I think that the car is broken.“) Following 
Shatz and Gelman, complex utterances with complement constructions were 
characterized in three ways according to the type of predicate complementizer 
produced: (1) that-complementizers (“I thought that it was hard”). (2) wh- 
complementizers such as what, how, and when (“I know what he wants”), and 
(3) to constructions (“I forget to look”). 
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Reliability of codes 
Two hundred and thirty-eight utterances including a variety of mental words 
were independently coded by two coders. The coders agreed on 84% of their 
codings for the function categories. On those individual words for which 
there were at least five tokens coded by both coders, agreement ranged from 
75 to 93%. Agreement scores were also computed for each coding category 
separately. Agreement on the mental state category was 84%. Scores on 
other categories ranged from 71% for action-memory to 100% for clarifica- 
tion. There was 100% agreement for the contrastive and initiation codings. 
Frequency and variety of mental verbs 
Of the 30,140 total utterances in the transcripts, there were 1483 mental verb 
utterances. Of these, 144 were judged indeterminant, i.e., uncodable. In all, 
utterances containing codable mental verbs increased iinearly from 1% of all 
utterances in the first time period to 8% in the fourth. Mental verbs increased 
in variety as well as in frequency from the use of two different mental verbs 
in the first month of the transcripts to 11 different verbs in the last month. 
Table 1 shows that verbs varied widely in the frequency with which they 
occurred. Know and think were the most frequent, comprising 48% and 27% 
respectively of all mental verbs used. Some other verbs appeared only sporad- 
icaIIy throughout the transcripts (e.g., figure, understand), whereas others 
appeared rarely at first and then more consistently (e.g., bet). because of this, 
the first appearance of a mental word may not necessarily provide a good 
indication of the time when a word was firmly established in Abe’s lexicon. 
Thus, Table 1 charts the age at which each verb had been produced three 
times as well as the age of initial occurrence. 
Fimction analyses 
Mental state function 
Table 1 shows that the earliest use of a mental verb to express a mental 
state function occurred at age 2;8, during the last month of the first time 
period. In that month, the verb think was used 3 times to express mental 
state. Table 1 also shows that 13 of the 17 verbs observed throughout the 
study were used at one time or another to express mental state. Only one 
verb, wonder, was used exclusively for mental state functions. All other verbs 
The acquisition of mental verbs 311 
were sometimes used for other functions, although pretend (31 mental in- 
stances, 1 nonmental) and dream (22 mental, 3 nonmental) were used primar- 
ily to express mental state and guess was used primarily for nonmental func- 
tions (3 mental, 31 nonmental). For 8 of the 13 verbs, first uses were of the 
nonmental variety, these 8 include think, the first verb used for a mentai state 
function. 
Variety, frequency and order of functions 
Table 2 shows that in the first S-month period Abe used mental verbs to 
express all possible functions. Despite the early occurrence of all functions, 
the modal function expressed changed from ‘I don’t know’ in the first time 
period to expression of mental state in the fourth period. Closer analysis of 
the first time period on a month-to-month basis confirms an order of acclui- 
sition of function that is suggested by the frequency data in Table 2. As 
shown in Table 3, the first month’s transcripts contained the earliest occuri.- 
ences of a mental verb, namely know in the standard phrase, I don’t know. 
With the exception of a single use of forget, this is followed by use of know 
and figure in Directing the Interaction (e.g., “you know”. “know what?“). 
Mental State and Modulation of Assertion functions both appear 2 months 
later and involve the verb think. (At this same time think is also used for 
Directing the Interaction.) In short, there is good evidence that Abe’s first 
uses of mental verbs involved either the idiomatic phrase I don’t know or 
pragmatic social routines used to focus and direct the conversation. The func- 
Table 2. Functional uses of mental verb utterances at the different age periods 
Proportion of mental verb Age period 
utterances” classified into 
2;4-2;S 2;9-3;l 3;2-3;6 3:7-3;ll 
..~ ___._. ..- 
Mental State 0.04 (3)” 0.23 (79) 0.28 (11Y) (1.43 (aIS) 
Expression of Desire (1.03 (2) 0.03 (ICI) 0.05 (21) 0.01 (7) 
Modulation of Assertiun 0.09 (7) 0. I I (3Y) 0.07 (79) o.utI (24) 
Directing the Interaction 0. IS (14) 0.27 (91) 0.30 (IX) 0.36 (171) 
Clarification 0.01 (1) D.02 (6) 0.07 (2Y) 0.05 (25) 
Action-Memory 0.01 (I) 0.01 (4) 0.03 (I’) 0.03 (14) 
I Don’t Know 0.65 (51) 0.31 (106) 0.20 (S4) 0.06 (2::) 
--.-~--~___-_--.._ _ ~__.___.___ .-_-.._~__-_-.--_ 
a Mental verb utterances here exclude indeterminate utterances. There were 83 rotal mental 
verb utterances in the first period, 387 in the second, 473 in the third, and 540 in the fourth. 
Proportions are based on the codable mental verb utterances, which numbered 79, 335,418. 
and 48.5 in the four successive time periods. 
b Numbers in parentheses show the absolute frequencies of various categories. 
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y Age by which a verb had occurred at least three times in a particular function. 
tions Mental State and Modulation of Assertion occur late in the fkst time 
period and relatively co-temporaneo\nly. 
Verb by function analyses 
There was little indication that paj:ticular words were associated primarily 
with one function. Many different verbs were used to express the most. fre- 
quent functions. For example, 10 difrerent verbs were used for Directing the 
Interaction, 13 for Mental State, and 8 for Modulation of Assertion. Only the 
Expression lof Desire, Clarification, und Action-Memory functions wer,e ex- 
pressed almost exclusively by one oi two verbs (hope and wish, mean, and 
forget, respectively). Typically, verbs that were eventually used for a vari:.ty 
of categories were recruited for a variety of functions rather early on in tht ir 
existence in the lexicon. For example, think was used for three different 
functions in the first time period and even know and guess, which served only 
one function each during the first time period, partook of as many different 
functions in the second time period as they did in the fourth (four for know 
and three for guess). 
Contrast&e utterances and initiations 
Contrastivesutterances that make explicit reference to a discrepancy be- 
tween internal states and reality-are considered an important source of evi- 
dence that the young child has bqun to characterize mental states as different 
f&n overt reality. Contrastives +omprised 20% of all utterances expressing 
mentd state functions in the second time period, 31% in the third, and 20% 
in the fourth period. Even in the first period, two of the first three mental 
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state utterances were contrastives referring to differences between prior men- 
tal states and actuality. Thus, our first instances for Mental State both seem 
more plausible in context than oth.er codings and share commonalities with 
paradigmatic adult expressions of mental state. 
As for the degree to which the child’s use of mental terms was self-initiated, 
only 10% of the observed uses of mental verbs immediately followed use of 
the verb by a parent. Seventy-five percent of the time the child’s use was the 
first occurrence of the verb in the conversation, and 15% of the time the 
child’s use followed a prior use by the child himself. There were no important 
differences in the proportion of these types of initiation for Mental State 
versus the nonmental functions. This substantiates that mental state utter- 
ances were not mere imitations of parental speech. 
Form analysis 
Complexity 
From their earliest occurrences, mental state utterances were more likely 
to be complex (i.e., contain more than one verb phrase) than simple. “Think 
of things” is an instance of a simple mental state utterance, whereas “I 
thought they were called strawberries” is an instance of a complex one. Seven 
of the first ten mental state utterances were complex, as were all three uses 
occurring in the first time period. In contrast, only 40% of the utterances 
expressing nonmental functions in that time period were complex. Across all 
time periods, mental state utterances were somewhat more likely to be com- 
plex than were nonmental utterances using mental verbs (72% Verslls BO%).’ 
Occurrence of complement constructions expressing nonmental functions 
Abe’s earliest utterances expressing mental state involved all three types 
of predicate complementation described earlier. To determine whether Abe 
was capable of producing such complement constructions before the first 
appearance of mental state utterances, we examined the transcripts prior to 
the first occurrence of mental state functions for instances of the various 
types. We found 22 instances of utterances with wh complements (“Show me 
how to work this.“), 15 with that complements, expressed or implied, (“I 
guess (that) I’ll have a bobber”.), and 32 with to constructions (“I ftied to 
eat it all”). In fact, 20 of the wh constructions., 7 of the that constructions, 
‘Despite relative complexity differences, neither utterances expressing mental state nor those expressing 
other functions exhibited much disfluency (as in, “I think . . . I think that’s a pig”). 9nly 3% of all mental verb 
utterances were disfluent. 
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and 25 of the to constructions occurred more than a month before the first 
mental state expression, and instances of all three constructions were present 
from the first month of the transcripts. Moreover, &etter than 40 of the 69 
instances of early complementation included a mental verb in a nonmental 
conversational function (such as the guess” example above). In short, Abe 
had considerable experience with the vocabulary and syntax common to ex- 
pressions of mental state before he began to produce such expres5ons. There 
seems to be no evidence that Abe’s production of utterances expressing men- 
tal state was delayed by a lack of liqguistic skill. 
Mental verbs were present in Abe’s speech as earl;4 as 2;4. Nevertheless, both 
the frequency and variety of mental verbs increased over time. Such verbs 
were first found in i.diomatic or conversational phrases, but soon thereafter 
they began to serve a wider variety of functions, with mental state expressions 
making their first appearance by 2;8. Contrastives were among the first men- 
tal state utterances. As for the necess,ary linguistic skill to produce utterances 
expressing mental state, Abe apparently had that skill well in advance of his 
first observed productions of mental state function. 
Sttkdy 2 
Study 1 involved an extensive examination of one child’s early mental verb 
use. To corroborate the results of that intensive study, we examined language 
samples from 30 additional children, using the same sorts of codes applied to 
Abe’s data. Since our primary concern was to verify the early appearance of 
Mental State utterances, the subjects corresponded closely in age and MLU 
to Abe at the time of his early transcripts. 
The data come from 15 male and 15 female children who had participated in 
a longitudinal study of language development (Hoff-Ginsberg, 1981). Each 
child was ‘to have been observed at ho,me in interaction with his or her mother 
on four different occasions at 2-month intervals. Twenty-nine, twenty-four 
and twenty-two mother-child dyads participated in the second, third, and 
fourth I&&S, respectively. At each visit a 20 to 30 minute sample of dialogue 
occu&.rg spontaneously du.ring play with toys was audio-recorded and later 
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transcribed. At the time of the first visits, the children ranged in age from 
2;0 to 2;6, with a mean MLU of 2.04 (S.D. = 0.43). At the final visits, age 
ranged from 2;6 to 3;0 and MLU averaged 3.31 (S.D. = 0.62). The average 
age of the subjects during the 6 month period (2;2 to 2;8) is comparable to 
Abe during Time Period I (2;4-2;8). Abe’s MLU during the last session of 
that time period was 3.81, well within one S.D. of the larger sample’s mean 
of 3.31. All child utterances from all four sessions were coded following the 
procedures described in the first study. 
Results 
Frequency anaIyses 
As a group, the children in Study 2 produced utterances containing a mental 
verb at a rate roughly comparable to Abe in Time 1 .* Across all four sessions, 
151 of their 17,494 utterances, or slightly less than l%, contained a mental 
verb, compared to 1.4 % of all Abe’s Time 1 utterances. Moreover, the choke 
of particular verb was also comparable. Know accounted for 74% ;?ERd think 
15% of the mental verb instances of Study 2 children and 66*/o and 16% 
respectively for Abe at Time 1. 
Function analyses 
Mental State ftmction 
Again the rate and timing of mental state productions are comparable to 
Abe’s data. For Study 2 children, seven of the 138 codable mental verb 
utterances (5%) expressed mental state; for Abe at Time 1, 4% did. All 
seven of the mental state utterances occurred in the last session, when the 
six children producing them ranged in age from 2;6-2;8. Abe’s three Time 1 
Mental State utterances occurred in the last month when he was 2;8. Study 
2 children produced two contrastives. One difference between Abe’s produc- 
tions and those of Study 2 children was in the choice of verb to express mental 
state. Abe’s first mental state utterances all used think: Study 2 childrelv used 
know five times and forget twice. 
‘Seven of the 30 children produced no mental verbs at all in any of the sessions. Nothing (age or MLU) 
particularly distinguished these seven children from the others. M’e cannot say whether these children were 
just a bit slower to produce such constructions or whether sampling procedures account for the lack of 
instances in these data. 
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Variety, j+equency, and order of functions 
With the exception of Expression of Desire, Study 2 children used mental 
verbs for all of the functions expressed by Abe during Time 1, and with 
comparable frequency. 56% of their mental verb utterances were coded as I 
don’t know, 24% were Directing the Interaction, 12% were Modulation of 
Assertion, 1% were Action-Memory, and 1% were Clarification (Abe’s com- 
parable Time 1 figures appear in Table 2.) 
As for order of occurrence, of the 23 children who produced at least one 
spontaneous mental verb sometime during the study, the first use for 11 
children was I don’t know, and for 8 others it was Directing the Interaction. 
Four others produced more than one function in the first session in which a 
mental verb appeared. For all four of these children, at least one of the uses 
was either I don’t know or Directing the Interaction. 
As in Abe’s data, there was a strong indication that Directing the Interac- 
tion preades Mental State uses. All six of the children producing Mental 
State uses in the last session had produced Directing the Interaction utter- 
ances previously. Also consonant with Abe’s, data was the lack of any consis- 
tent ordering between the Modulation of Assertion and Mental State func- 
tions. By the fourth session, the former had appeared in two children’s 
speech, and the latter in the speech of five children. One child began to use 
both in the same session. 
Form analyses 
Similar to Abe’s data, early Mental State utterances in this sample included 
simple sentences (e.g., “Kitty know”) and more complex forms involving 
predicate complementation (e.g., “Someone know how a truck goes”). Of 
the seven Mental State utterances, five involved predicate complementation 
(four wh- complement forms, one to- construction). Again a consideration of 
the children’s productions prior to their first uses of Mental State function 
confirms the claim that lack of linguistic skill alone cannot account for the 
dearth of Mental State expressions. Of the six children who used mental 
verbs to express Mental State meanings, all used at least one form of predi- 
cate complementation in their preceding sessions; four of the six used at least 
two forms. Of the 17 children who produced mental verbs but no Mental 
State utterances during the course of the study, all used at least one type of 
predicate complementation for other purposes, 13 used at least two types and 
8 used all three. Thus, all of the 23 children had at least some competence 
in predicate complement construction, to say nothing of their ability to use 
their vocabulary in simple sentences to express Mental State (e.g., Kitty 
know). 
Summary 
The Study 2 children were similar to Abe at the comparable age, No children 
were observed using mental verbs to express Mental State before the age of 
2;6. All children used mental verbs to serve at least the Directing the Intera.c- 
tion function before they used them for Mental State. Six of the children in 
this study produced at least one Mental State expression at about the same 
age as Abe began to produce them, and two of these were contrastives. 
Finally, the children exhibited at least some ability to produce the kinds of 
syntactic constructions often used to express Mental State. This argues against 
the possibility that even earlier appearance of Mental State expressions is 
blocked by linguistic deficits. 
Discussion 
Our study has revealed several important aspects of the development of m( n- 
tal reference. First, consider simply the use of mental terms regardless of 
function. Mental verbs begin to find their way into the child’s speech during 
the third year of life. In Abe’s data, mental verbs were present. although 
extremely rare, in the earliest transcripts (age 2;4); in the second study, the 
average age of the seven children using any mental verbs irl their first session 
was 2;2. From this start, frequency of mental verb use increased for both Abe 
and the sample of 30 children. In all, 24 of the 31 two-year-olds we observed 
produced at least one mental verb during our studies. Thus, the ages of first 
occurrence of mental verbs observed here are consistent with reports of other 
investigators (Bretherton, et al., 1981; Limber, 1973). 
Mental verbs are not first used to refer to internal mental states or proces- 
ses, however. Our functional analysis revealed that all seven children who 
ultimately produced a mental reference had previously used mental verbs 
with at least the Directing the Tnteraction function. It is essential, therefore, 
if the child’s language is to be a measure of his understanding of mental life, 
to go beyond a tally of the mere production of particular words to an assess- 
ment of the semantic: and pragmatic functions of those words. 
In this regard one important aspect of our findings concerns the usefulness 
of our method for determining the time at which the understanding of mental 
state is demonstrable. Using a conservative functional clode along with an 
analysis of contrastives, we were able to identify with confidence early occurr- 
ences of mental state expressions. Indeed, for some of our subjects the first 
occurrences of mental reference lag behind other uses of mental verbs by 
only a few months. To date, no experimental methods have been successful 
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in eliciting as clear a display of this sort of knowledge in such young children. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that our method is not overly conservative. 
Since the method is linguistically based, it is open to the criticism that children 
might have had understandings about internal mental states which they could 
not express linguistically. However, we found no evidence that linguistic de- 
ficits might have generally blocked even ertlier production of mental state 
expressions. There was ample evidence thal both the lexical items and the 
complex forms typically used. to express mental state were readily available 
to most of the children in advance of their being employed in mental refer- 
ence. It seems unlikely, then, that the children would have had an under- 
standing of mental state but simply could not refer to it in their natural 
speech. Therefore, natural language data, when analyzed appropriately with 
regard for both form and function, provide a viable tool to access information 
about the child’s understanding of the internal world. 
Related to the question of when reference to mental state first occurs is 
the question of whether such reference is reserved for one’s own mental 
states or whether early instances refer to the states of others as well. The 
issue is particularly relevant to the child’s status as a communicator because 
it has been argued that the understanding that one’s interlocutor has beliefs, 
thoughts, and goals is a necessary basis for true participation in mature human 
communication (see Dennett , 1978; Shatz, 1983; in press). The data 
from our two studies are equivocal on this issue. Whereas reference to 
others’ mental states did not appear in Abe’s data until three months after 
the first appearances of self-reference, three of the six children in the second 
study produced as their single instances of mental state function, references 
to mental states other than their own. Since these data are limited in quantity, 
they are not definitive, but at least they suggest that once mental state expres- 
sions do start to appear, their domain of reference is not limited to the self 
for very long, if at all. 
One final issue deserving discussion is the question of possible precursors 
for the various functions; in particular, the possibility that knowledge of some 
functions for mental verbs facilitates acquisition of other functions. A striking 
fact in the data is that all children producing Mental State utterances had 
previously produced mental verbs to direct the interaction. This consistent 
nse of mental verbs for conversational functions prior to the expression of 
mental state is especially interesting in light of the etymological relations 
often assumed for such functions. Conversational functions are presumably 
derived by emphasizing selected aspects of the semantic descriptions of cer- 
tain lexical items. For exampIe, tfie use of think to express uncertainty (as in 
Modulation of Assertion) takes advantage of the fact that the English verb 
think is not a factive.. That is, the propositional contents of the mental act of 
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thinking are not necessarily true. Since declarative utterances unmarked by 
performatives are taken to be assertions of truth (e.g., It’s raining out), mark- 
ing an utterance with I think implies a movement away from that assertion 
(I think it’s raining out). Likewise, explicitly mark,ing an utterance with a 
factive (as in I know it’s raining out) emphasizes or focuses on the assertion 
of truth. In this stnse the conversational function Modulation of Assertion is 
said to depend on the semantic descriptions entailed by certain mental verbs 
as they are found in expressions of mental states (se:e Urmson, 1963). Thus, 
in terms of semantic etymology, Mental State is a precursor for conversaGonal 
functions. Yet, the order of the children’s productions is reversed, with at 
least some conversational functions occurring earlier than the Mental State 
function. 
By one account, the reversal in the child’s order of acquisition wonld be 
superficial. Several pieces of data argue for this position. For one, there 
seems to be very little productivity in the earliest uses of mental verbs for 
conversational functions. Most of the ewrliest conversational productions in- 
volve the stereotypic forms, Know what? or I don’t know. In Abe’s data, for 
example, productivity with a range of le:rtical items w-as not demonstrated for 
the earliest function, Directing the Interaction, until about the same time the 
Mental State function appeared. Also, ihe more subtle conversational func- 
tion Modulation of Assertion does not consistently precede Mental State. 
These data suggest that early conversational uses are merely rote-learned 
expressions. Whether children’s knowledge becomes organized later accord- 
ing to the semantic bases suggested by the etymological accounts remains an 
open question, however. In our data, there was no support for this possibility 
either. For example, Mental State did not regularly precede Modulation of 
Assertion. Thus, it would be premature to conclude the early mental verb 
uses observed in our data either bear no relation to later knowle.dge or that 
they produce strong facilitation for the acquisition of Mental State under- 
standing. Further research should investigate the question of whether some 
functions are facilitative precursors of others. 
In summary, the present research into the child’s reference to mental 
events describes the early development of an ability to distinguish and com- 
municate about the internal world of thoughts, memories, knowledge, and 
dreams. Mental reference reflects a conceptual acquisition of great import. 
Here we have identified its tenuous but unmistakable beginnings. 
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La capacitd de refkhir et de 6mmuniquer sur des croyances, connaissances. objectifs personnels ou altruistes 
est g&Walement consider6 ?nme la marque de la cognition humaine. Les debuts de cette capacitC sont peu 
connus. Cela tient B I’absence de methodes permettant de cerner avec prkcision ces capacitks chez les jeunes 
enfants. La capacite des jeunes enfants B refldchir sur des Ctats mentaux ou les communi.,Jer a et6 etudite 
en utilisant une m&fhode d’analyses convergentes des &non& pronon& en milieu naturel. La premi&e etude 
Porte sur la freqmence et la fonction dans les productions d’un enfant de 2;4 h 4 ans, des verbes rkferant ii des 
Ctats mentaux tels les verbes peruser et savoir. Dans la seconde Crude on examine des exemples plus courts 
recueillis durant une p&iode de 6 mois aupr& de 30 enfants de 2 ans. Les donnt+es suggerent que les verbes 
mentaux sont d’abord utilisCs avec une fonction de communicatron plut6t que de rkftrence mentale. Les 
premkes utilisalAons mentales commencent dans la deuxieme mclitit de la troisieme an&e. La plupart des 
enfants dtudies faisant preuve de la connaissance linguistique ndcessaire pour r6f&er A des dtars mentaux. on 
pense que l’absence de telles rkf&ences est due au fait que les jeunes enfants ne sont pas cowcients de tels 
ktats ou tout au moins qu’ils ne comprennent pas leur pertinence comme sujets de conversation. 
